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Abstract: Al Jazeera (AJ) has been a defining feature in developing news 
media in the Middle East and beyond. The satellite-broadcasting network 
has played a leading role in bringing stories and perspectives that other in-
ternational media do not always cover, if at all. More importantly, it has been 
a champion for democracy and human rights in the Middle East, thereby 
provoking the ire of Arab autocratic rulers, which went to great lengths to 
silence the Qatar-based television news network. The latest Gulf Crisis, in 
which four countries (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and 
Egypt) blockaded Qatar in July 2017, is another attempt to silence this media 
institution and peg back the region to the pre-Arab Spring era. The anti-Qatar 
quartet issued an ultimatum of 13 demands to be fulfilled within ten days. 
The list included paying reparations, shutting down Al Jazeera, curbing bi-
lateral relations with Iran, closing a Turkish military base, and submitting to 
monthly external compliance checks. However, the crisis could be a blessing 
in disguise for Qatar and the network in its campaign for greater freedom of 
expression in the Middle East. This article analyses the crisis from a media 
political economy perspective.
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Introduction
DIPLOMATIC quarrels in the Arabian Peninsula have a long history, and Qatar aligned itself with stronger powers (e.g. Ottoman Empire, British Colonial Rule) in order to confront regional threats. It is conventional 
wisdom that states holding more power wield influence and can alter the be-
haviour of smaller states (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, pp. 49-52). After the British 
withdrawal from east of Suez in 1971, Saudi Arabia seized the moment to bully 
its neighbours and claim territories from Abu Dhabi and Oman (Hellyer, 2001, 
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p. 167), while also becoming the de-facto protector of Qatar. This state of af-
fairs lasted until the early 1990s, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait 
and threatened to invade Saudi Arabia as well. It became quickly apparent that 
the Saudis were unable to defend their own borders, let alone their neighbours’ 
too. This signalled a shift in Saudi—Qatari relations, since state survival super-
sedes all other considerations, and Saudi foreign policy tools that were com-
monly used with Gulf countries proved their limitations (Al Rasheed, 2017).
Qatar’s path was therefore about to witness a major change at the hands of 
the Crown Prince at the time, and future Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al 
Thani,1 who had a very different view on the future role of Qatar. He sought from 
the onset to resist Saudi suzerainty and pursued his nation’s interest by leveraging 
its own capabilities and resources, unencumbered by the Saudi threat. Having 
the world’s third-largest reserves of natural gas, the Qatari leaders chose to think 
outside the realm of conventional pipelines, which would have been hindered 
by Saudi Arabia. They focused instead on exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
to the world through maritime routes. Thanks to the most sophisticated LNG 
infrastructure in the world (QNB, 2015), Qatar has become the world’s largest 
gas exporter (EIA, 2015), and was able to fully capitalise on the basin it shares 
with Iran—Saudi Arabia’s nemesis.
The immense revenues that followed turned Qatar into not just the world’s 
richest nation, with an annual per-capita income of $130,000, but also the world’s 
largest LNG exporter (Champion, 2017). Such achievements irritated Saudi 
Arabia, which hoped to clip Qatar’s wings and restore the status quo with the 
help of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain (Kamrava, 2009, p. 403). 
Relations reached their lowest point in February 1996, when an attempted coup 
against Qatar’s leader took place. It is believed that Saudi Arabia financially 
supported this operation (BBC News, 2000), which severely dented Saudi-Qatari 
relations (Roberts, 2012). Tensions simmered back and forth between Qatar and 
neighbouring Gulf monarchies, and in 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain 
withdrew their ambassadors from the country over its support of the Arab upris-
ings (Kirkpatrick, 2014). Things returned to normal a year later, and nothing 
prepared even the most seasoned of analysts to the developments that unfolded 
in the closing week of May 2017. The scope of hostile actions, speed of escala-
tion, and toxic rhetoric directed at Qatar by the quartet—the aforementioned 
three countries in addition to Egypt—was unparalleled. 
Lacking a manifest casus belli to justify escalation, one was swiftly manu-
factured. On 24 May 2017, unidentified hackers exploited a cyber-bug in the 
website of Qatar News Agency (QNA) to disseminate fabricated news. The fake 
report claimed that Qatar’s Emir criticized in his speech the United States, while 
praising Hezbollah and Hamas as resistance movements. The Qatari authorities 
immediately asked the United States for help, and a team from the Federal Bureau 
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of Investigations (FBI) led a thorough investigation. A few weeks later, Qatar’s 
attorney general stated that communication used in the security breach originated 
from countries laying siege to his country. The Washington Post validated the Qa-
tari version of events on 16 July 2017, and referred to information obtained from 
U.S. intelligence officials, stating that ‘the United Arab Emirates orchestrated the 
hacking of Qatari government news and social media sites in order to post incen-
diary false quotes attributed to Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani, 
in late May that sparked the on-going upheaval between Qatar and its neighbours’ 
(Nakashima & DeYoung, 2017).
Shying away from any investigations, the anti-Qatar quartet hastily cut 
diplomatic ties with Doha, while also blockading Qatar’s airspace and shipping 
channels, stopping their food supplies, and declaring Qatari nationals persona 
non grata, straining the region’s economic and trade relations at heavy human and 
financial costs. The quartet not only snubbed official denials from Doha about 
the fake news, but they also issued an ultimatum of 13 demands to be fulfilled 
within ten days (McLean, El Gamal, & Finn, 2017). The list included paying 
reparations, shutting down the Al Jazeera satellite-broadcasting network (AJ), 
curbing bilateral relations with Iran, closing a Turkish military base, and sub-
mitting to monthly external compliance checks (Middle East Eye, 2017). In the 
light of Doha’s refusal and the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by US Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson, the list was reduced to six principles (Lederer, 2017). A few 
weeks later, the quartet announced that the 13 demands plus the six principles 
were in fact still on the agenda before ceasing Qatar’s blockade (Cone, 2017). 
Figure 1: Al Jazeera’s newsroom in Doha—target of repeated threats by the four-
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In any case, the different ultimatums constituted an attempt to ‘reduce 
Qatar to a Saudi client state, and humiliate the Emir of Qatar and the Al Thani 
dynasty to the point where their rule would be in question’ (Lieven, 2017), and 
consequently they were duly rejected by Qatar. Moreover, observers believe 
the blockade has been counterproductive, and has in fact deepened Qatari ties 
with regional powers such as Turkey and Iran, as well as with two other states 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Oman and Kuwait. This has allowed for food 
supplies and other goods to still flow into Qatar’s ports and airports (Tharoor, 
2017). Consequently, the quartet no longer insisted on the 13 demands, reducing 
the list to six broad principles (BBC News, 2017).
However, aligning Qatar with Saudi Arabia and its allies ‘militarily, po-
litically, socially and economically’ remains the end game (Lieven, 2017), and 
AJ’s closure continues to be on the quartet’s agenda. This is made especially 
stark when considering that its website was also blocked by the four countries’ 
internet providers, and Saudi Arabia has banned hotels and tourist facilities from 
airing AJ’s channels in their premises, threatening to punish contraveners with 
the closure of their facility and a fine of up to US$26,000. In a statement, the 
Saudi Commission for Tourism and National Heritage ordered that ‘all chan-
nels from the Al Jazeera Media Network must be removed’ and replaced with 
channels compatible with ‘official Saudi television ones’. Additionally, the 
quartet threatened lengthy jail terms and fines for their nationals if they express 
sympathy with Qatar on social media. The UAE said offenders would face a 
jail term from three to 15 years and a fine not less than 500,000 UAE dirhams 
(US$136,000) (Al Jazeera, 2017).
The Saudis’ tendency to impose media censorship and suppress any alterna-
tive views invites a sense of déjà vu. Journalist Yvonne Ridley observes: 
In 1980, for example, the government in Riyadh threatened governments, 
politicians and TV corporations across the globe if they dared to broadcast 
a TV docudrama, Death of a Princess.2 The Saudis tried to intimidate 
Britain with economic sanctions, including the withholding of oil sup-
plies, and recalled their ambassador from London. In the US, oil-rich 
companies threatened to withdraw sponsorship and advertising from TV 
stations if the programme was broadcast. A Middle East state attempting 
to gag the world? Yes, that is exactly what Saudi Arabia was doing…More 
than a decade later, in 1996, the BBC was forced to close down its Arabic 
section following pressure from Riyadh when the Saudis again sought to 
suppress a documentary exposing more executions in the country. Around 
250 journalists lost their jobs. (Ridley, 2017) 
What’s more is that the quartet’s representatives didn’t beat about the bush and 
conceal their dislike for media freedoms. Saudi permanent representative to 
the United Nations, Abdullah al-Mouallimi said: ‘If the only way to achieve 
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that [i.e. the quartet’s demands] is by closing down Al Jazeera, fine. If we can 
achieve that without closing down Al Jazeera, that’s also fine. The important 
thing is the objective and the principle involved’ (BBC, 2017). UAE repre-
sentatives adopted a similar stance. When asked whether the closure of AJ was 
a reasonable demand, Omar Ghobash, the UAE’s Ambassador to Moscow said: 
‘We do not claim to have press freedom. We do not promote the idea of press 
freedom. What we talk about is responsibility in speech’ (Wintour, 2017). How-
ever, this stance drew the ire of international organisations, and Prince Zeid bin 
Ra’ad al-Hussein, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, denounced 
it as an ‘unacceptable attack’ on free speech. Faced with such an opposition, 
Noura al-Kaabi, the UAE Minister for the Federal National Council, said that 
the UAE had backed off its demands for either channel to be closed if there was 
a ‘fundamental change and restructuring’ (Philp & Spencer, 2017).
Al Jazeera: Perennial irritant for autocratic leaders
To understand the rationale behind the attacks on Qatar in general, and AJ in 
particular, one must go back two decades. From the time it was launched in 
1996, AJ has contributed to energise the Arab public sphere, and has been a 
perennial irritant for autocratic leaders and dictators in the Middle East. Be-
fore AJ’s launch, government-controlled television was the defining feature of 
broadcasting in the region. This meant that official Arab television media was 
no more than a mouthpiece for government policies. Their coverage consisted 
mainly of barren and repetitive broadcasts, mostly intended to sing the praise of 
the rulers’ actions (Lynch, 2005, p. 40). Even live interviews were not tolerated, 
as interviewees’ opinions had to be checked before being aired.
The Qatari leadership minimised any government interference with the AJ 
network’s affairs. Therefore, despite being launched as a state-financed satel-
lite channel, the Qatari government’s subtle distancing made AJ look similar to 
the BBC rather than a state-controlled Arab network. In contrast to other Arab 
television networks, where little to no sensitive political, social, economic, or 
religious subjects were ever discussed, AJ introduced a new journalistic culture 
to the Arab world and produced several talk shows that were fast paced, inno-
vative, and daring. The network adopted a daring editorial line, which left no 
political taboos, and gave airtime to guests from across the political spectrum. 
After decades of state pressures and censorship, the winds of freedom blown by 
AJ reinvigorated the Arab public sphere in many ways (El-Nawawy & Iskandar 
2002; Miles 2005).
One weekly programme that exemplifies the change brought forward by 
AJ was Al Ittijah Al Mo’akis (The Opposite Direction). Launched in November 
1996 (and still airing today), this programme is presented by Faisal al-Kasim, 
a Syrian Druze, who had worked for the BBC for many years. The presenter 
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spends the first two minutes asking questions that reflect positions on a chosen 
topic, and then opens the floor to two guests representing opposite sides of the 
spectrum. The show stirred up controversies and regularly features opponents of 
Arab regimes, and the anchor took pride in ‘de-iconising’ many of the myths that 
have dominated the Arab world for decades (Al Kasim, 1999). It also received 
plenty of official complaints and censure from these governments. For example, 
Abdullah Al Nafisi, a Kuwaiti intellectual who was the guest of this talk show, 
launched a salvo of criticism against the Gulf monarchs and attacked the Saudi 
religious establishment for ignoring major issues such as royal corruption. 
As a result, Saudi authorities added more restrictions against AJ, and coerced 
the only Saudi journalist working for AJ to resign from the network (El-Nawawy 
& Iskandar 2002, pp. 117, 119). Also, on 27 January 1999, the programme hosted 
a debate about the then-raging Algerian civil war. The oppositional viewpoint 
clearly gained the upper hand in the debate, at which point the Algerian authorities 
cut the electricity supply to the capital Algiers (and other cities) to prevent the 
programme from screening. Even Qatari government positions constituted no red 
line for the daring Syrian anchor, whose programme discussed Qatar’s overtures 
to Israel and hosted an episode titled ‘Why is Qatar crawling toward Israel?’ The 
local guest, who was a professor of political science at Qatar University, heavily 
and openly criticised his government’s policies (Al-Kasim, 1999).  
In an article he wrote for the Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 
Al-Kasim related his experience: 
Al Jazeera’s editorial policy is so lax that I am hardly ever given orders 
regarding programme content. The station has an even wider scope of 
freedom than the BBC Arabic radio, where I worked for 10 years. I tackle 
issues that I never even dreamed of covering during my service at the 
BBC. (Al-Kasim, 1999) 
With such editorial independence, AJ exposed the misdeeds of local regimes 
and served as a platform for opposition groups by airing controversial debates, 
and exposing corruption and widespread human rights abuses. The winds of 
freedom blown by AJ meant also that repressive regimes no longer had the mo-
nopoly over information. By transcending borders, AJ’s broadcasts were able 
to bypass the restrictive state media, connect with communities, challenge the 
official discourse, and expose the regimes’ lack of legitimacy.
Arguably, AJ seems to echo the deliberative-discursive model of a Haber-
masian public sphere. Jürgen Habermas3 played a big role in placing the concept 
of public sphere at the centre of the debate on democratisation and participatory 
politics. It was in his seminal work, The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere (1962), that Habermas offered the fullest articulation of the concept of 
the public sphere and traced its historical development economically, socially, 
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politically, and institutionally. According to him, one of the most important 
dynamics took place when the members of the bourgeois society engaged in 
rational discussion through the public use of their critical judgment, which 
liberated them from the shackles of political and religious authorities and their 
imposed interpretations, leading to an early formation of public opinion. There 
are many parallels between this model and the democratic process in the Arab 
World, which needs open spaces of rational discussion. Democracy is not just 
a voting-centric arena, in which fixed preferences and interests compete via 
mechanisms of aggregation. Rather, democratisation starts when everyone has 
a say. Voices rather than votes are the vehicle of empowerment. 
Satellite television: A new Arab broadcast culture of pluralism and fairness
Furthermore, broadcast media also bridges the gaps between different social 
groups and public cultures. Mass media, especially satellite television, has re-
moved existing barriers and changed the ways these social groups and sub-
groupings interact with one another. Media can be a powerful vehicle in estab-
lishing a strong democratic culture by emphasizing democratic values such as 
tolerance, pluralism, diversity, and fairness. In this context, AJ has contributed 
to the making of a new political culture based on the aforementioned values, 
which echo the argument of several theorists, who have stressed the importance 
of democratic culture in bringing about democratic change. For example, aca-
demics Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba argued in The Civic Culture: Politi-
cal Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963) that a democratic form of 
participatory political system requires a particular political culture consistent 
with it. It remains debatable, though, whether democratic culture precedes the 
democratic process and paves the way for change, or is a result of it.
Such aspects and many more were instigated by AJ. More importantly, 
they obliged autocratic Arab rulers to become much more attentive to public 
opinion. The ruling elites viewed with deep scepticism this media institution, 
in which anchors and guests routinely deliberate democracy, good governance, 
and human rights. For them, AJ not only plays a big role in the development of 
free flowing information and freedom of expression, but also acts as an agency 
of representation that allow diverse social groups and classes to express their 
views that could, if left unchecked, start influencing decision making processes 
within their realms towards democracy.
Arab Spring: A narrative seeking an end to nepotism and corruption
By being a long champion for freedom of speech in the Arab World, and by provid-
ing airtime to dissenters, opposition groups, and controversial figures, AJ became 
the household name in the 1990s and 2000s in terms of advancing the democratic 
agenda, exposing the misdeeds, human rights abuses, and corruption of Middle-
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Eastern regimes. This stance has slowly but surely invigorated the Arab public 
sphere, which became much more conscious of the need for change. Therefore, 
when a series of uprisings and mass protests hit North Africa and the Middle East 
from January 2011 onwards—also known as Arab Spring—these demonstrations 
called for an end to nepotism and corruption, improvement of economic conditions, 
establishment of democratic representation, and protection of human rights. 
After many years of covering events amid heavy censorship, the Qatar-based 
network proved very skilful in countering attempts by the different regimes to 
restrain the movement of its journalists. AJ, through both its Arabic and English 
networks (AJA and AJE), was well positioned to cover these events. With AJA 
already enjoying strong pan-Arabic viewership, AJE targets different English-
speaking markets. Both networks covered events in Tunisia, when a young 
vegetable cart owner called Mohamed Bouazizzi immolated himself after being 
humiliated by police, igniting several protests across the country. AJ was one 
of the first outlets to broadcast pictures of his self-immolation, even though its 
bureau had been closed for years by the Tunisian regime. 
Using mobile phone footage and social media, AJ outmanoeuvred both the 
Tunisian regime and competing networks by grasping very early the meaning 
and magnitude of the protests. They eventually brought about the demise of the 
Tunisian dictator; an outcome many in the region considered impossible. The 
24/7 coverage provided by AJ during the Arab Spring events, combined with 
viral social media, online blogging, and mobile telephony, vividly publicised the 
uprisings. This boosted the spirits of activists and encouraged more resistance and 
mass defiance. Jordanian Maisara Malass, an opposition activist, described AJ 
as a ‘media brigade’ whose coverage had helped ‘to spread the revolution from 
one city to the other’ (Zayed, 2011).
AJ’s Arab Spring coverage was sharp and relentless, even if at times it was 
deemed more sympathetic toward some particular forces, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood (The Economist, 2013).  Nevertheless, AJ’s reporting in Egypt at-
tracted world attention to the demonstrations and gave events a human dimension, 
thereby creating a bond between viewers in their living rooms and the protesters 
in Tahrir Square. When demonstrators ultimately forced former Egyptian Presi-
dent Hosni Mubarak to quit power, many people around the world embraced 
the narrative conveyed by AJ, whose journalistic efforts were rewarded with 
the Columbia Journalism Award (2011) bestowed by Columbia University’s 
Graduate School of Journalism (Reuters, 2011).
On the other hand, the initial success encountered in some Arab Spring 
countries triggered heavy-handed reactions from the Gulf autocratic regimes, 
such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which felt threatened by the democratic ad-
vance in some countries (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt). Many observers might not have 
paid attention, but the media has often reported the rise of the UAE as the ‘little 
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Sparta’ of the region (Chandrasekaran, 2014; Law, 2017; The Economist, 2017); a 
nickname that was incidentally coined by retired US General James Mattis, now 
Donald Trump’s Secretary of Defence. Such viewpoint was echoed recently, when 
The Washington Post commented that ‘the UAE’s rise as a top-tier US military 
ally had set it apart from other Arab nations, enhancing its outsize ambitions 
and regional clout’ (Fahim & Ryan, 2017). Under the watch of Muhammad bin 
Zayed, the Crown Prince of the UAE, the country ‘has gone from being a haven 
mindful of its own business into the Arab world’s most interventionist regime. 
Flush with petrodollars, he has turned the tiny country, whose seven component 
emirates have a combined population of almost 10 million (only about 1 million 
of whom are citizens), into the world’s third-largest importer of arms. He has 
recruited hundreds of mercenaries’ (The Economist, 2017).
The rise of Little Sparta
The rise of little Sparta coincided with the Arab Spring. ‘There is a dark side’ to 
the UAE, explains veteran journalist Bill Law who reported extensively from 
the Middle East, ‘as there was in the ferociously militaristic and authoritarian 
original. It is one that clashes with the brilliantly promoted image of a tolerant, 
tourist and business friendly oasis that the Emirates, and principally Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi, have so successfully projected. The UAE has relentlessly crushed 
human rights in its bid to silence dissent and stamp out what it sees as the perni-
cious influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. To that end, dozens of people have 
been sentenced to long terms in jail on evidence widely seen as flawed, much 
of it secured through coercion and torture’ (Law, 2017).
It was no coincidence that the UAE (alongside the Saudis) interfered with 
and deteriorated the situation in the Arab countries where the Arab Spring made 
some noticeable progress. They incited and materially supported their proxies to 
use putsches, counter-revolutionary movements, false-flag terrorist groups, and 
extended repressive means. Such methods turned peaceful demonstrations into civil 
and sectarian wars, as in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. It also induced many people 
around the world to the fallacy of lamenting the Middle East’s inability to establish 
modern statehood, omitting to focus on the strong nexus between the autocratic 
elites in the region and their foreign sponsors, which remain firmly opposed to any 
genuine progress for democracy in the Middle East (Davidson, 2016).
Yet, despite spending dozens of billions of dollars to restore the pre-2011 
order, the Emiratis, Saudis and their proxies are still struggling to achieve 
dominance on the ground. Most importantly, their message has not won hearts 
and minds mainly because of AJ, which deconstructs the counter-revolutionary 
narrative at every turn. And while the UAE and Saudi Arabia have dozens of 
satellite television channels, such as Al-Arabiya and Sky Arabic, and tried very 
hard to challenge AJ, their efforts seem to have failed, as many still consider AJ 
as ‘the trusted eye and ears of the Arab and Muslim worlds’ (Mahruqi, 2017).
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Palace coup within Saudi Arabia
Last but not least, another layer of complexity has been added to the already 
convoluted situation. The new Trump administration seems to have tacitly ac-
quiesced to a palace coup within Saudi Arabia, and helped the Deputy Crown 
Prince, Mohamed Bin Salman (MBS), jump the succession line, and establish 
himself as the upcoming king (Hearst, 2017). Meanwhile, MBS has tied him-
self with the UAE, which is bent on pursuing its own regional influence. Amid 
this real-life Game of Thrones, the Trump administration has also encouraged 
Arab allies to form a military alliance with Israel against common foes (e.g. 
Hamas). As a result, governments that call for a solution to the Gaza conflict 
through international law (e.g. Qatar) found themselves ostracised by this new 
coalition. Therefore, the quartet’s blockade of Qatar aims by the same token to 
pre-empt AJ’s role in producing critical reporting in any expected war against 
the Palestinians.
In fact, the Israelis got a preview of such coverage’s impact in July 2017, 
during the wave of protests by Palestinians against heightened Israeli security 
measures near the ancient compound, known to Muslims as al-Haram al-Sharif, 
which houses the al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam’s third-holiest site. The ensuing clo-
sure of the al-Aqsa mosque prevented thousands from praying and resulted in a 
standoff. AJ’s coverage of these events shed an unpleasant light on the practices 
of Israel to the extent that millions of viewers around the world became aware 
of the situation, and expressed their solidarity with the Palestinians. In the face 
of such opposition, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu backed down 
from his earlier decisions. These developments are reminiscent of the 2000 
Al-Aqsa Intifada, which significantly boosted AJ’s international profile. At that 
time, as dozens of Palestinians were killed by the Israeli army and thousands 
were injured, Western media resorted to self-censorship, while AJA aired graphic 
footage of death and demolition. Netanyahu later wrote on his Facebook page: 
I have spoken several times to law-enforcement authorities demanding 
the closure of Al Jazeera’s offices in Jerusalem. If this does not happen 
because of legal interpretation, I will work to enact the required legislation 
to expel Al Jazeera from Israel. (The New Arab, 2017)
Consequently, Israeli Communications Minister Ayoub Kara convened a press 
conference on 6 August 2017, in which he announced a series of steps aimed at 
closing down Al Jazeera in Israel (Tucker, 2017). The Israeli government’s reac-
tion shows that AJ can be an ominous witness; one that the Israel-Arab coalition 
against terrorism, as named by President Trump, would rather do business without. 
Conclusion
All things considered, at the time of writing 100 days after the start of the crisis, 
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the latter continues unabated and a swift resolution seems remote. On 9 September 
2017, Saudi Arabia suspended any dialogue with Qatar after a phone call between 
the leaders of two countries which initially suggested a breakthrough in the Gulf 
dispute (Reuters, 2017). It is evident, however, that the quartet has a long standing 
score to settle with Qatar in general, and AJ in particular. As explained earlier, the 
illegal blockade imposed on Qatar and threats against AJ are part of the ongoing 
attempts to restore the status quo in the Middle East in favour of authoritarianism 
and against the advancement of media freedoms and quality journalism.
Leading NGOs, such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human 
Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders, coupled with established news 
publications like The New York Times (2017) and The Guardian (2017), noted 
such adverse development, and subsequently condemned the quartet’s efforts 
to undermine freedom of press and international law. Beyond expressions of 
sympathy, Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, delivered 
an important speech on 24 July 2017 in Doha at the Freedom of Expression 
conference,4 in which he concluded: 
There are important things that Qatar can do to maintain the moral high 
ground from which it has so greatly benefited in its dispute with its neigh-
bours. As the old adage goes, every crisis is also an opportunity. Yes, Qatar 
today faces a crisis, but it is also an opportunity to become a regional leader 
on human rights. I hope Qatar will seize that opportunity. (Roth, 2017)
Roth was exactly right, for this crisis could be a blessing in disguise. In order 
to counter Little Sparta, Qatar has to seize this chance, engage with its critics, 
and continue its political, economic, social, and legal reforms so as to become 
its enemy’s antithesis: Athena. 
Notes
1. For a short background information on the former Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin 
Khalifa Al Thani, the following resource is accessible: Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-
Thani, Emir. Current Leaders of Nations, Gale, 1998. Biography in Context. Retrieved 
on July 22, 2017, from link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/K1610000166/BIC1?u=fairfax_
main&xid=9eb83b4a
2. Death of a Princess was a 1980 drama-documentary that was based on the true story 
of a young Saudi Arabian princess and her lover who had been publicly executed for 
adultery. 
3. Jürgen Habermas is a German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition of critical 
theory and pragmatism. He is best known for his theories on communicative rationality 
and the public sphere. Habermas argues that in a democracy-driven system, the activist 
public sphere is needed for debates on matters of public importance, and as well as the 
mechanism for that discussion to affect the decision-making process.
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4. More than 150 representatives from civil society, academia and intergovernmental 
human rights bodies gathered in Doha to discuss key issues in the field of free expression, 
including internet freedom and journalist safety in a conference organised by the Qatar 
National Human Rights Committee, in cooperation with the International Press Institute 
(IPI) and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ). The international conference, 
entitled ‘Freedom of Expression: Facing Up to the Threat’ was held in Doha, Qatar, 
from 24-25 July 2017. The event was held amid a diplomatic crisis in the Middle East 
pitting Qatar against the quartet, which have imposed a land, air and sea blockade, and 
demanded that Qatar shut the influential broadcaster Al Jazeera and other media outlets.
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